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I. INTRODUCTION 
Between June 20 and June 27, 1997, federal and state courts handed down 
four decisions that could crucially impact the future of Internet content 
regulation) The cases include the controversial United States Supreme Court 
case ACLU v. Reno, which struck down most of the federal government's 
lACLU v. Reno, 117 S. Ct. 2329 (1997) (decided June 26, 1997); American Libraries 
Assoc. v. Pataki, 969 F. Supp. 160 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (decided June 20, 1997); ACLU v. 
Miller, 977 F. Supp. 1228 (N.D. Ga.1997) (decided June 23, 1997); People v. Lipsitz, 663 
N.Y.S.2d 468 (Sup. Ct. 1997) (decided June 23, 1997). 
129 
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Communications Decency Act.2 Three of the rulings invalidated laws that 
directly regulated the Internet, while one decision upheld use of a pre-existing 
law to regulate Internet activity.3 
In each case, the judges openly pondered how to harness the Internet or even 
whether to harness it, citing its geographical vagueness as a factor that 
complicates the question.4 Their opinions ran the gamut. In the stead of any 
consensus, state and federal legislators continue their attempts to restrain the 
world's "information superhighway."S Should any governmental body be able 
to regulate the Internet? Due to its unorthodox ignorance of geography, a 
concept important to many court cases, can any such body regulate the 
Internet? 
This Note summarizes recent tests of state and federal Internet content 
regulations and analyzes the impact the Internet's incompatibility with "real 
space" geography had or might have had on the courts' reasoning. To some 
extent, it posits what problems the incompatibility poses for impending 
legislation. In the midst of such discussion, this Note opines that state and 
federal regulations of the Internet could conceivably both fail Constitutional 
muster, due specifically to the "Net's" physical shortcomings.6 
Part II of this Note offers a background of the Internet's different 
communication capacities and describes its conflicts with geography. Part III 
summarizes the courts' problems in deciding whether they have personal 
jurisdiction over specific Internet activities. 
Part IV briefly outlines arguments for and against state regulation of the 
Internet. First, it capsulizes the U.S. Supreme Court's dormant Commerce 
Clause standards. Second, it summarizes one federal court's application of 
those standards to invalidate a state Internet content law. Third, it applies the 
standards to another state law case. Finally, it uses a third case to weigh possible 
limitations to dormant Commerce Clause invalidations of laws that restrict 
content on the Internet. 
247 U.S.C. § 223(a)(1)(B), (d) (1996) (amending Communications Act of 1934, 
§ 233(a), (d)). See also Annoy.com Attacks Remaining Communications Decency Act 
Provisions (posted Nov. 3, 1997) (visited Jan. 4, 1998) <http:/ /www.aclu.org/issues/ 
cyber I updates/ clunov03.html>. 
3Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2329; Pataki, 969 F. Supp. at 160; Miller, 977 F. Supp. at 1228. 
Lipsitz, 663 N.Y.S.2d at 468 (applied consumer fraud protection statute to Internet usage 
situation). 
4See Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2343, 2353; Pataki, 969 F. Supp. at 169; Miller, 977 F. Supp. at 
1228; Lipsitz, 663 N.Y.S.2d at 474. 
5"Information superhighway" is a term for the Internet often used by Vice President 
AI Gore. For an interesting branch-off on the highway, see LANCE ROSE, NETLAW: YOUR 
RIGHTS IN THE ONLINE WORLD 170-71 (1995). 
6The "net" is a common slang name for the Internet, used so much that a 1994 movie 
of that name starring Sandra Bullock played off the double entendre. See also Lawrence 
Lessig, Constitution and Code, 27 CUMB. L. REv. 1, 10 (1990). 
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Part V looks at federal regulation of the Internet. It first details U.S. Supreme 
Court Justice Sandra Day O'Connor's concurring opinion in ACLU v. Reno, in 
which she hints at zoning the Internet. It then applies a First Amendment 
zoning test to the content prohibited by the Communications Decency Act and 
other states. The Note concludes in Part VI with details of a third type of 
regulation, the Internet industry's self-regulation, and earmarks the industry 
efforts as the best way for regulation to proceed. 
II. MAPPING OUT 1HE INTERNET 
The Internet is at its most basic an international "network of networks."7 Its 
"chaotic, random structure" of more than 500,000 independent network 
computers connect to nine million host computers in ninety countries,B making 
the information housed on those computers rapidly available to anyone with 
the correct computer software, a modem and an "Internet service provider" 
("ISP").9 It is by nature an unregulated medium, and no one entity completely 
controls it.lO 
Despite the fact that so many people can access the Internet from so many 
places, the Internet operates largely contrary to the idea of geography.ll It has 
no geographically fixed point and, at this point, no borders.l2 To some 
commentators, the medium-known to most as "cyberspace"l3_"virtually 
transcends geography."14 In fact, most of the concepts which a person uses to 
communicate on the Internet make it almost impossible to determine the 
physical location of an accessed resource or another user. 
A. Internet Addresses 
Although Internet communications are based on a seemingly geographical 
concept-addresses-most do not consistently mirror a geographical location. 
Instead, they provide a "logical" framework in which the information can 
travel.l5 
7 Pataki, 969 F. Supp. at 164. 
Bid.; Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2336. 
9 ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824,832-833 (E.D. Pa. 1996). 
10 Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2336. 
l1See Pataki, 969 F. Supp. at 167, 169. 
12Jd. at 167. 
l3Reno,ll7S. Ct. at2335. 
l4Report on Electronic Commerce, Hype Gives Way to Reality in 1996: Electronic 
Commerce Feels Hangover, in INTERNET AND ONLINE LAw i, x (Kent D. Stuckey ed., 
1996)[hereinafter Hype Gives Way]. 
l5Pataki, 969 F. Supp. at 165. 
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In their most general form, the addresses-also called "domain 
names"-describe the type of organization a user is contacting.l6 Addresses 
have several tiers, starting from the end of the address, that increase in 
specificity.l7 For example, the designations such as "-.com" and "-.gov" ends 
many addresses; "-.com" signifies a person or entity working through a 
commercial user, while the "-.gov" designation ends the addresses of networks 
associated with the federal government.18 The complete address 
"jsmith@omega.csuohio.edu"19 might hint to the location of the information 
received. However, the address "pixie@geocities.com" does not, especially once 
it is known that Geocities, an ISP, offers Internet access to people in practically 
every state.20 
B. Modes of Communication 
Most of the ways a "cybernaut"21 can communicate on the Internet rely on 
Internet addresses, and many of the modes have their own devices that can 
blur the location of communicators even more. One example is electronic mail 
("e-mail"). 
"E-mail" software lets any user transmit an electronic 
message-conceptually equivalent to instant mail-to anyone who has 
another Internet address.22 As stated before, the addressee's actual location or 
even identity is rarely known. Users can create an e-mail alias23 or employ an 
16Hearst Corp. v. Goldberger, No. 96 Civ. 3620, 1997 WL 97097, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 
26, 1997). 
17Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 985 F. Supp. 949, 952-53 (C.D. 
Cal. 1997). Under a contract with the National Science Foundation, a company called 
Network Systems Inc. manages domain name registrations. Other top-level domain 
names include "-.org," for non-profit organizations; "-.edu," for educational institutions; 
".net," for among other things, networks. Registration is affordable: $100 for a start-up 
two-year contract, and $50 per year thereafter. I d. at 953. 
Most Internet addresses have two "fungible" addresses: an alphanumeric domain 
name and also a numeric "internet protocol" such as "123.456.123.12." While both work 
equally as well, domain names have been the subject of court cases because of the 
familiarity that the names can have with users and consumers. See Hearst, 1997 WL 
97097, at *2. 
lBLockheed Martin Corp., 985 F. Supp. at 952,953. 
19For a detailed explanation of domain names, see also MTV Networks v. Curry, 867 
F. Supp. 202,203-204 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. 1994). 
20See Geocities, (posted date unknown) (visited Feb. 8, 1998) 
<http: I /www .geocities.com/ main/ info>. 
21A "cybernaut" is a slang term for an Internet user. See Dan Burk, Federalism in 
Cyberspace, 28 CONN. L. REv. 1095, 1099 (1996). 
22Shea v. Reno, 930 F. Supp. 916, 927 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). 
23Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2337 n.20. 
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anonymous remailer24 to make their identity and location even more difficult 
to discern. 
A user who communicates by subscribing to a "listserv"25 has no way of 
knowing the e-mail addresses or locations of other subscribers. A listserv 
automatically compiles messages sent to it by its members and mails out a "list" 
at the end of a certain period.26 Contributors to "newsgroups" give only their 
e-mail addresses.27 Newsgroups are monitored discussion lists that a person 
accesses through a fixed link.28 
Internet relay chat ("IRC")29 and file transfer protocol30 do not use addresses. 
IRC users participate in real-time discussions and identify themselves with any 
name of their choosing upon entering the chat.31 File transfer protocol users 
contact a host computer network and download files anonymously.32 
On the World Wide Web, "surfers"33 use addresses to reach information 
destinations, but can also bypass addresses entirely by using sometimes 
nondescript links to move from information site to information site.34 The 
"Web"35 consists of an innumerable collection of information-filled pages 
written in compatible languages that a user accesses with web "browser" 
software.36 Besides using known addresses, Web surfers move from site to site 
with the help of "hypertext links"37 or highlighted text on a Web page that, in 
the background computer language, connects the user to another Web site. The 
Web also houses "search engines,"38 which search the entire Web for sites 
containing certain words or phrases, and create links to those pages. 
24Jd. 
25Shea, 930 F. Supp. at 927. 
26[d. 
27[d. See also JONATHAN ROSENOER, CYBERLAW: THE LAW OF THE INTERNET 13 (1997). 
28Shea, 930 F. Supp. at 928. 
29Jd. 
30Jd. 
31Id. See also RosE, supra note 5, at 14, 15. 
32Shea, 930 F. Supp. at 929. 
33Traveling along the World Wide Web from site to site is commonly called "surfing." 
See Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2335. 
34Shea, 930 F. Supp. at 929. 
35Jd. The "web" is a slang term for the World Wide Web. 
36Jd. 
37RoSENOER, supra note 27, at 9-11. See also Miller, 977 F. Supp. at 1230, 1232. 
38Shea, 930 F. Supp. at 929. 
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The Web also is popular because of the ease with which users can set up their 
informational sites. However, once "content provider" posts their content on 
the Internet, they cannot prevent that content from being accessed by anyone.39 
C. The Way Information Travels 
The transmission of information on the Internet from address to address 
does not normally follow a straight line. Instead, information is broken into 
"packets"40 and transmitted through any number of routes, as the capacity of 
an intermediary network allows. It reassembles at the final address.41 For 
example, e-mail messages sent from the headquarters of Exchangenet,42 an ISP 
in Cleveland, Ohio, to the National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
Lewis Research Center located in the same city normally travel through a server 
in Atlanta, Georgia. 
To summarize, even with domain names or addresses, Internet users might 
not accurately know from where information has come nor to where they have 
sent it. Such a system lies contrary not only to geography, but to courts and 
laws.43 The inability to predict the location of a site one might visit, coupled 
with the inability of the site to prevent one's visit, could cause conflicts of 
opinion in state's ability to pass laws and courts' abilities to apply such laws, 
as discussed below. 
III. PROBLEMS WITH PERSONAL JURISDICTIONAL 
In the past few years, judges, as much as users, have grappled with the 
problem of the Internet sites' lack of discernable location-most basically when 
they have questioned whether to grant personal jurisdiction over an Internet 
user. For example, court opinions cross the gamut on what contact is enough 
for "minimum contacts"44 and what action constitutes "purposeful 
availment."45 Although one federal district court46 recently offered a set of 
39Reno, 117S. Ct. at2336. 
40Shea, 930 F. Supp. at 926. 
41Jd. 
42for example, a message sent on February 1, 1998 went through the following 
servers and addresses: from core1-hssi8.ds3. cleveland.en.net (204.89.181.210), to 
901.Hssi1-0.GW1.CLE1.AL TER.NET (137.39.144.17), to FddiOO.CR2.CLEl.Alter.Net 
(137.39.37.100), to 119.Hssi60.CR2.CHI1.Alter.Net (137.39.58.178), to 
312.atm10.brl.chil.alter.net (137.39.13.105), to core3-hssi3 O.WillowSprings.mci.net 
(206.157.77.81), to bordercore2.Atlanta.mci.net (166.48.48.1), to 
oarnet-c-omci.Atlanta.mci.net (166.48.49.254), to oeb1-atm20. columbus.oar.net 
(199.18.202.11), to nasa-sl2-2.cleveland.oar.net (199.18.105.234)m to 198.118.128.1, and 
finally to fwOl.lerc.nasa.gov (139.88.145.14). 
43Hearst, 1997 WL 97097, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). 
44International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310,316 (1945). 
45Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235,253 (1958). 
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guidelines, they might be premature, since recent opinions continue to greatly 
conflict. 
The Internet complicates the issue because it does not mesh well with the 
normal conventions for personal jurisdiction. Traditional notions of 
export/import, sending/receiving, and traveling-notions that in the real 
world are relied upon to assert jurisdiction-do not apply to the Internet.47 
The main struggle has been how to classify the Internet medium. One option 
is to compare the Internet to a national magazine,48 because it is accessible by 
anyone anywhere in the country, and not targeted at any residents in particular. 
Another recommendation is to compare Internet sites to national television 
shows, since they do not target specific audiences, and like television, users 
must take affirmative steps to access it.49 
Such classifications, however, would impart almost a per se availment upon 
the people who provide the Internet's content, and would make irrelevant what 
kind and extent of contact providers had with the forum state.SO As before 
stated, content providers cannot prevent anyone from accessing their 
information anywhere once they upload that information onto the Internet.Sl 
Courts have split on whether the classifications apply and whether Internet 
existence is enough for defendants to be hauled into court. 52 
One state court recently reasoned in a case against a corporation that, by its 
invitation to United States users to download images, the company "is causing 
and contributing to their distribution within the United States."53 Mere 
advertising without purposeful contacts with a certain state is enough for 
personal jurisdiction, because the appearance of the user's information on the 
Internet "indicates a defendant's intent to serve the market in that state .... 
Defendants who know their message will be broadcast in this state are subject 
to suit here."54 A federal court ruled for personal jurisdiction merely on future 
contacts: "defendant has obtained the website for the purpose of and in 
46SF Hotel Co. v. Energy Inv., Inc., 985 F. Supp. 1032 (D. Kan. 1997). 
47 State Indictment of Internet Casino Highlights Online Jurisdiction, 66 USLW 2054, 2055 
(1997)[hereinafter Internet Casino]. 
48See Keeton v. Hustler, 465 U.S. 770 (1984). 
49 Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2336,2345. 
50 See International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316; see Hanson, 357 U.S. at 253. 
5lReno, 117S. Ct. at2334. 
52 See infra notes 52-70. 
53Humphreyv. GraniteGateResorts,Inc.,568N.W.2d 715,719 (Minn. Ct. App.1997) 
(citing Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Chuckleberry Publ'g, Inc., 939 F. Supp. 1032, 1044 
(S.D.N.Y. 1996)). 
54 Id. (citing Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court of California, 480 U.S. 102, 112 
(1987)). See also Quality Solutions, Inc. v. Henry Zupac, 993F. Supp. 621 (N.D. Ohio 1997) 
(Defendants were subject to personal jurisdiction when they ran an Internet site 
accessible in Ohio and advertised in trade journal with large Ohio circulation). 
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anticipation that internet users, searching the internet for websites, will access 
the defendant's website and eventually sign up on the defendant's mailing list. 
Its intent is to reach all internet users," regardless of location. 55 
A seemingly larger number56 of courts, however, have decided to require 
more than an Internet content provider's "purposeful availment"57 to bring the 
provider into the court's jurisdiction. 
A finding of personal jurisdiction in [a state] based on an Internet web 
site would mean that there would be nationwide (indeed, worldwide) 
personal jurisdiction over anyone and everyone who establishes an 
Internet web site. Such nationwide jurisdiction is not consistent with 
traditional personal ~urisdiction case law nor acceptable to the Court 
as a matter of policy. 8 
Instead, the courts suggest that a ruling of personal jurisdiction should depend 
upon a showing of some kind of active pursuit of contacts with the forum in 
question.59 E-mail messages to an Internet service provider in the forum state 
satisfy the test.60 Other examples include providing a toll-free number with the 
Internet content in question;61 soliciting contributions;62 providing an e-mail 
address to which interested parties can write for more information;63 and 
providing a prompt connected to the site so that those interested parties can 
sign up for a mailing list subscribe to the service, or order merchandise.64 
However, the line between passive and active availment blurred in a recent 
case, as evidenced by a Missouri state court's recent injunction against a gamb-
55Maritz, Inc. v. Cybergold, 947 F. Supp 1328, 
56The term "larger" is used for what it is worth. Internet law is still a small, but 
burgeoning, field of law. 
57Cybersell, Inc. v. Cybersell, Inc., 130 F.3d 414,417 (1997). 
58 Hearst, 1997 WL 97097, at *1. 
59 See SF Hotel Co., 985 F. Supp. at 1035 (determining that a passive Web site "is not 
grounds for the exercise of personal jurisdiction"). 
60Edias Software Int'l LLC v. Basis Int'l Ltd., 947 F. Supp. 413 (D. Ariz. 1996). 
61 Inset Systems, Inc. v. Instruction Set, Inc., 937 F. Supp. 161 (D. Conn. 1996). 
62.H~roes, Inc. v. Heroes Found., 958 F. Supp.1 (D.D.C.1996) (soliciting contributions, 
prov1dmg toll-free number, and using infringing trademark and logo was sustained 
contact). 
63zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc. 952 F. Supp. 1119 (W.D. Pa. 1997). 
64Maritz, 947F. Supp. at 1332-1333. See also Parks Inn Int'l, Inc. v. Pacific Plaza Hotels, 
Inc., 5 F. Supp. 2d 762,764-65 (D. Ariz. 1998) (web site's "interactive" registration form 
along with listing of address, telephone and fax number, and e-mail address, satisfied 
purposeful availment.) 
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ling Web site. 65 Missouri prohibits gambling anywhere other than at 
state-approved riverboat casinos.66 The ruling judge banned the Internet 
company from operating, marketing, offering or promoting a gambling 
establishment in the state, based on the fact that the company held two accounts 
opened by Missourians.67 Both accounts were opened by state investigators.68 
A Kansas federal district court recently posited a balancing rule to reconcile 
the conflicting cases.69 "[T]he likelihood that personal jurisdiction can be 
constitutionally exercised is directly proportionate to the nature and quality of 
commercial activity that an entity conducts over the Internet," its opinion 
said?O "This sliding scale is consistent with well developed personal 
jurisdiction principles."71 
While the balancing rule merits serious consideration, the Internet holds 
forth questions regarding personal jurisdiction that have yet to be evaluated. 
Courts have not discussed notions of unfairness and undue burden on novice 
internet content providers versus commercial providers,72 nor have they tested 
jurisdiction of Internet areas more vague than the Web, such as IRCs, 
newsgroups and listservs?3 Courts also have spoken little of personal 
jurisdiction in criminal trials, which could become a factor as more and more 
states pass legislation criminalizing some pornographic aspects of the 
Internet?4 Foremost, despite the conflicting talk and attempt at resolution, the 
question of exactly where transactions take place when they occur on the Web 
does not have a clear answer?5 
65Joe Lambe, No Missouri Bets by Internet Link, Judge Rules, KAN. CITY STAR, May 24, 
1997, at Al. 
66[d. 
67[d. 
68[d. 
69SF Hotel Co., 985 F. Supp. at 1034. 
70Jd. "A passive Web site that does little more than make information available to 
those who are interested in it is not grounds for the exercise of personal jurisdiction." 
I d. 
71[d. 
72See Pataki, 969 F. Supp. at 171. 
73See Zeran v. America Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327,328 (4th Cir. 1997). AOL users can 
communicate publicly by posting messages on the ISP's "bulletin boards." Zeran filed 
a negligence suit against AOL based on information posted on one of the boards. Id. 
74(post date unknown) <http:/ /www.aclu.org/issues/cyber/censor/stbills.htm> 
(visited on Jan. 5, 1998)[hereinafter http:/ /www.aclu.org/]. 
75 Internet Casino, supra note 47, at 2055. 
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IV. STATE REGULATION: LACK OF SITUS A STUMBLING BLOCK 
Without knowing the fixed boundaries of an Internet site, it would seem 
misconceived for legislators to write a law to regulate it within a fixed area. 
However, as of June 1997, at least thirteen states had passed legislation 
regulating the Internet since 1995, and many of them had additional legislation 
under discussion?6 While several of those states have created laws to tax 
commercial Internet activities, most of the new laws aim to regulate the content 
of transmissions across the Internet medium, such as an e-mail and its 
attachments, or access to Web pages or newsgroups with certain types of 
content.77 For example, a recently overturned Virginia law made illegal any 
use of state-owned computers to access "sexually explicit material."78 
State legislators have made pornographic images and writings their main 
content target,79 and opponents responded in 1997 by challenging several of 
the statutes on First Amendment grounds.SO In the past two years, however, 
commentators, opponents and courts have started to use the United States 
Constitution's Commerce Clause as another-and perhaps initial-test to 
determine the validity of state Internet regulations.Sl In the words of 
commentator Glenn Harlan Reynolds: "[o]nly where regulations pass the 
Commerce Clause test is it even necessary to address First Amendment 
issues."82 In cases involving a New York law and a New Mexico law, a federal 
district court ruled them unconstitutional on Commerce Clause grounds.83 An 
analysis of the clause's applicability to the Internet's geographically vague 
nature demonstrates that most state regulations are ill-suited to the cyberspace 
medium. 
76http:/ /www.aclu.org/, supra note 74. California, Connecticut, Florida, Illinois, 
Kansas, Minnesota, Montana, New Mexico, Nevada, North Carolina, Oklahoma, 
Virginia and, of course, New York and Georgia passed bills during 1995 through 1998. 
Illinois, New York and Virginia had additional legislation under discussion. At least 
nine states had legislation pending in 1998. 
77Jd. 
78Jd. See also Urofksy v. Allen, 995 F. Supp. 634 (E.D. Va. 1998); VA. CODE 1950 
§ 82.1-804; <http://www.aclu.org/court/urofskyvallencom.html>; VA. CODE ANN. 
§§ 2.1-804-806 (Michie 1997). 
79http:/ /www.aclu.org/, supra note 74. 
80http:/ /www.aclu.org/, supra note 74; Miller, 977 F. Supp. at 1228; Pataki, 969 F. 
Supp. at 183. The Pataki court bowed to the U.S. Supreme Court's then impending 
determination on the issue. 
81 U.S. CaNST. art. I, § 2, d. 1. For additional commentary, see also Glenn Harlan 
Reynolds, Virtual Reality and 'Virtual Welters': a Note of the Commerce Clause Implications 
of Regulating Cyberporn, 82 VA. L. REv. 535 (1996); Dan Burk, Federalism in Cyberspace, 28 
CONN. L. REv. 1095 (1996). 
82Reynolds, supra note 81, at 536. 
B3Pataki, 969 F. Supp. at 160 (as practically predicted by Burk, supra note 81); ACLU 
v. Johnson, 4 F. Supp. 2d 1029 (D.N.M. 1998). 
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A. The Dormant Commerce Clause 
The United States Supreme Court ("the Court") and other courts historically 
have used a loose definition for the concept of interstate commerce, holding 
that even situations such as driving people across state lines fall under the 
category.84 Using the Court's rulings as a guideline, lower courts have 
determined that Internet communication, specifically electronically mailing 
images through the Internet, qualifies as interstate commerce.85 The decisions 
suggest that the Internet like all interstate commerce, should be regulated by 
the federal govemment.86 
Few federal Internet laws currently exist that can preempt state regulation 
because it conflicts with the federal right to regulate under the Clause. In June 
1997, the Court ruled unconstitutional most of the federal government's 
Communications Decency Act ("the Act," "the CDA"), affirming the earlier 
judgment of a special three-judge district court panel.87 Still, even when 
Congress has not regulated an area, state laws must survive scrutiny under the 
clause's negative or "dormant" use, which "limits the ability of states to impede 
the flow of interstate commerce and to legislate in that area deemed reserved 
for federallegislation."88 
Commentators have adopted one of two approaches to analyze the Internet 
regulation for "dormant" conflicts: the dormant analysis89 and the tax 
analysis.90 Theorists on each side admit problems with state regulation of the 
Internet stem in part from a lack of firm physical presence for the medium's 
activities.91 
Under the dormant analysis, any state regulations that "purposely 
discriminate" against interstate commerce are practically invalid per se without 
extraordinary justification.92 Ordinarily, a court must first identify a local 
84Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941); see also Camps Newfound Owatonna, 
Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564 (1997). 
85United States v. Schooley, No. ACM 32682, 1997 WL 517486 at *1 (A.F. Ct. Crim. 
App., Aug. 11, 1997) (citing United States v. Carroll, 105 F.3d 740 (1st Cir. 1997) and 
United States v. Thomas, 74 F.3d 701,706-9 (6th Cir. 1996)). 
86See infra notes 114-69 and accompanying text. 
87 Reno, 117 S. Ct. 2329. Some of the regulations within the Act still pass muster, such 
as the ISP's immunity from liability as a publisher of defamatory material that appears 
on their service. See Zeran, 129 F.3d at 328. 
88Burk, supra note 81, at 1123-24. 
89 Id. at 1123. 
90Reynolds, supra note 81, at 539. Logistically speaking, the analyses could both fall 
under the dormant analysis heading. 
91 Burk, supra note 81, at 1126; Reynolds, supra note 81, at 539. 
92Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970). 
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public interest benefited by the regulation and determine its legitimacy.93 
Courts have roundly rejected as illegitimate any sort of measure that 
economically benefits or protects the state at the expense of other states.94 If 
the state interest is deemed legitimate, the court must then balance it against 
the federal interest in maintaining an unburdened interstate commerce.95 The 
weight of the burden allowed hinges on the local interest's nature and the 
option of reasonable alternatives to the legislation that would cause "less of an 
impact" on interstate commercial activities.96 
Local health and safety measures have been accorded leeway in their 
impingement on interstate commerce.97 However, the Court drew a line even 
there in a 1981 case over an Iowa transportation regulation that conflicted with 
all of its neighboring states. 
Regulations that touch upon safety, especially highway safety, are 
those that 'the Court has been most reluctant to invalidate' ... But 
incantation of a purpose to promote the public health or safety does 
not insulate a state law from Commerce Clause attack. Regulations 
designed for that salutary purpose nevertheless may further the 
purpose so marginally, and interfere with commerce so substantially, 
as to be invalid under the Commerce Clause.98 
In general, the Court has determined that such state regulations, especially 
those deemed inconsistent with the policies of surrounding states, cause an 
inordinate burden on the commercial activities between them.99 "The menace 
of inconsistent state regulation invites analysis ... because that clause 
represented the framers' reaction to overreaching by the individual states that 
might jeopardize the growth of the nation and in particular, the national 
infrastructure of communications."lOO Such statutes may also cause an 
extraterritorial effect in the areas they were created to regulate, adversely 
affecting interstate commerce. For example, a Connecticut law requiring beer 
93Jd. at 142. 
94Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437 (1992). 
95Pike, 397 U.S. at 142. But see Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enters., Inc., 486 
U.S. 888, 897 (1988) Oustice Antonin Scalia stated that "[w]eighing the governmental 
interests of a state against the needs of interstate commerce is ... a task squarely within 
the responsibility of Congress."). 
96Pike, 397 U.S. at 142. 
97Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662 (1983). 
98Jd. at 670 (quoting Raymond Motor Transp. Inc. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429,443 (1978)). 
99 See Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520 (1959) (striking down an Illinois 
law requiring special mudflaps on trucks in contrast to the laws of surrounding states). 
See also CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 481 U.S. 69 (1957) (involving a state's 
corporation regulations). 
lOOPataki, 969 F. Supp. at 169 (referring to Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 
312 (1992)). 
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distributors to post their wholesale prices in the state to affirm they were no 
higher than those charged in the four states bordering was invalidated on the 
grounds of its extraterritorial effect.lOl "While a State may seek lower prices for 
its consumers, it may not insist that producers or consumers in other States 
surrender whatever competitive advantages they may possess."102 Finally, 
state legislators may overstep their bounds-invalidating their legislative 
work-if the interest they seek to regulate transcends state boundaries; in other 
words, one that demands national uniformity or that is part of a national 
market.103 
In t;he tax analysis, commentators analogize Internet regulation with the 
Court's Quill Corp. v. North Dakota decision to strike down a state's attempt to 
tax interstate mail orders.104 In Quill Corp., the Court determined that 
"unexceptional" procedures of state authority become unauthorized when 
multiple standards would create a large burden for those organizations who 
operate in more than one state.lOS As logic might suggest, "if this 'interstate 
burden' analysis is sufficient to bar state action in the extremely important area 
of taxation, then it is difficult to see why it should not apply with equal force 
in the area of obscenity law."106 
B. Internet Characteristics Fit with Commerce Clause Violation 
A simple comparison of the characteristics of the Internet medium to the tests 
set out by the Court finds that a generic state law regulating Internet content 
would likely run afoul of the federal government's dormant Commerce Clause. 
As a medium accessible by anyone from practically anywhere, the Internet 
transcends state boundaries.107 By design, it is a national, if not worldwide, 
transportation device for communication.108 Because Internet users generally 
cannot prevent their communications or content from being accessed by a 
geographical section of the country,109 any state law that regulates Internet 
content or communications within a state runs the risk of having an extra terri-
101Healy v. Beer Institute, 491 U.S. 324 (1989). 
102Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. New York State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573, 580 
(1986). See also BMW of North America v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996). 
103Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona ex. rei. Sullivan,325 U.S. 761, 767 (1945). See also Pataki, 
969 F. Supp. at 161 (in which Judge Preska analogizes the Internet to a highway or a 
railroad). 
104504 U.S. at 298. 
lOS Reynolds, supra note 81 at 539. 
106Jd. at 539-40. 
107 Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2335. 
108Southern Pac. Co., 325 U.S. at 767; Pataki, 969 F. Supp. at 160. 
109 Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2336. 
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torial effect on Internet sites outside that area.llO The inability to prevent access 
also puts content providers at risk to host of inconsistent regulations in different 
jurisdictions.lll To compensate, non-profit and profit content providers would 
be forced to censor their content to satisfy the "lowest common denominator" 
state law, creating an undue burden on interstate commerce that would 
outweigh the local benefit that may have spawned the legislation.l12 
A finding of economic benefit discrimination would most likely be limited 
to a specific case. For example, potential regulation in New York that hopes to 
ban internet sales of alcohol might be struck down under dormant Commerce 
Clause scrutiny because its outward motive is to help the sales of in-state 
wholesalers.113 
C. American Libraries Association v. PatakiY4 Its Commerce Clause Application 
and Ramifications 
Still in its youth, Internet law as of yet has a dearth of case law with actual 
Internet Commerce Clause application. Perhaps the first case that directly 
applied the Commerce Clause to an Internet regulation involved a national 
association that successfully sued the State of New York in federal court, 
claiming the state's 1996law outlawing adult Internet contact of a sexual nature 
with minors was unconstitutional on First Amendment and Commerce Clause 
grounds.115 On June 20, 1997, United States District Court Judge Loretta A. 
Preska permanently enjoined any state action under the law after analyzing the 
statute under commerce clause scrutiny: 
I find ... that the Internet is analogous to a highway or railroad. This 
determination means that the phrase 'information superhighway' is 
more than a mere buzzword; it has legal significance, because the 
similarity between the Internet and more traditional instruments of 
interstate commerce leads to analysis under the Commerce ClauseY6 
Specifically, Judge Preska ruled that the criminal statute under scrutiny had 
extraterritorial effects and placed a burden on interstate commerce that clearly 
exceeded its benefit to its local interest.117 Generally, however, Preska found it 
110See Healy, 491 U.S. at 324. 
lllSee Bibb, 359 U.S. at 520. 
ll2Jnternet Casino, supra note 47, at 2055. 
113'Cyberbooze' Increasingly Common on Internet, Group Says (posted Dec. 12, 1997) 
(visited Dec. 12, 1997) <http:/ /www.cnn.com/TECH/>. 
114Pataki, 969 F. Supp. at 160. Pataki is governor of New York. 
115Id. Many other groups joined as plaintiff, including American Booksellers 
Foundation for Free Expression, Bibliobytes, Magazine Publishers of America, Art on 
the Net and the ACLU. 
116 Id. at 161. 
117Jd. at 169. See also N.Y. PENAL LAW§ 235.21 (McKinney 1984). 
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difficult to determine how a state could fashion an internet content regulation 
without violating a prong of dormant Commerce Clause scrutiny. us 
The New York statute in question, section 235.21 of the New York Penal Law, 
made it a crime to "intentionally use ... any computer communication system 
allowing the input, output, examination, or transfer, of computer data or 
computer programs from one computer to another, to initiate or engage" in 
communication with a minor that "in whole or in part depicts actual or 
simulated nudity, sexual conduct or sadomasochistic abuse, and which is 
harmful to minors."119 Preska determined that the law contained no language 
that required the criminal activity to occur solely in New York, nor, as 
evidenced by its legislative history, was it intended to apply only to New York 
residents making contact with other New York residents,l20 The benefit to the 
local interest the law seeks to protect-the possible prosecution of New York 
sexual predators who attempt to entice New York children-is arguably small, 
considering the amount of pornographic material and conversation sent to U.S. 
Internet computer servers from sites outside the country,l21 Its size is especially 
small when compared to the possible chilling effect the law could have on 
anyone whose Internet communication might be accessed by a New Yorker 
and might be criminally liable,l22 
Moreover, Preska determined, the nature of the Internet effectively precludes 
the possibility that the New York lawmakers could avoid dormant Commerce 
Clause scrutiny with any statute that limits its effect to interstate 
communication because "no [intrastate] communications exist."123 Limited by 
technology and a lack of fixed locational situs to specifically target, an 
Oklahoma artist who showcases his wares on a Web page cannot close his site 
to New Yorkers any more than he can close it to countries outside the United 
States.l24 Most times, the Internet user may be ignorant as to where his message 
has arrived, and even if not, the user may be misled about the location.l25 On 
the flip side, a New York e-mail may well pass through computer servers in 
any number of locations outside the state before it arrives at the computer of 
another New Yorker, turning intrastate transmissions into interstate mails, and 
118Pataki, 969 F. Supp. at 170. 
119 Id. at 163. 
120Jd. at 169. 
121See Shea, 930 F. Supp. at 916, affg without opposition, Reno v. Shea, 117 S. Ct. 2501 
(approximating thirty percent of sexually explicit material currently available on the 
Internet originates outside the United States); See ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 882 
(E.D. Pa. 1996) (nearly half of sexually explicit material originates outside of the United 
States). 
122See Pataki, 969 F. Supp. at 173. 
123Jd. at 171. 
124Jd. at 173. 
125Jd. at 170. 
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involving the sender or service provider in a potential myriad of inconsistent 
laws.126 "Further development of the Internet requires that users be able to 
predict the results of their Internet use with some degree of certainty," Preska 
cautioned in her opinion.l27 With no certainty of locational effect by state laws, 
the Internet should receive uniform, predictable national treatment in the form 
of federal regulations. 
D. ACLU v. Miller:128 A Hypothetical Example 
A recently overruled Georgia law attempted to regulate the Internet at its 
lack-of-location core: domain names and e-mail addresses.129 Although the 
federal district court in ACLU v. Miller did not use a dormant commerce clause 
analysis, instead opting to rule only on the plaintiffs' First Amendment claim, 
the case seemed ripe for review under the clause. Had that court applied the 
dormant clause test, it would have found a different but compelling argument 
to enjoin enforcement of the statute. 
On June 23, 1997, Senior District Judge Marvin H. Shoob of the Federal 
Northern District of Georgia ruled that the law's restrictions were vague and 
overly broad, so much that Internet users would have a difficult time 
determining what actions would constitute a violation.130 In his analysis, Judge 
Shoob pointed to (1) the law's lack of necessity of intent to defraud and (2) the 
questionable definition of the word "use," as parts of the legislation that might 
126See supra notes 40-47 and accompanying text. 
127Pataki, 969 F. Supp. at 183. 
128Jd. at 80, 183. Judge Preska's determination made quick, albeit limited, impact on 
state Internet regulation elsewhere. Little more than a year after Pataki, a New Mexico 
federal judge ruled on almost identical commerce clause analysis to enjoin action under 
an Internet content-related criminal statute. Johnson, 4 F. Supp. 2d at 1029. 
The law, adopted in 1998, prohibited "dissemination" on-line to a minor of content 
"harmful to a minor," such as nudity or sexual conduct. Violation of the law was 
punishable by imprisonment of one year and/or a $1,000 fine. N.M. STAT. ANN. 
§ 30-37-3.2(A) (1978). See also Johnson, 4 F. Supp. 2d at 1029 (complaint), available on 
<http://www .aclu.org/ court/ acluvjohnson_complaint.html>. 
Citing Pataki in his brief opinion, District Court Judge Hansen determined that the 
statute violated the federal commerce clause because it regulated conduct outside New 
Mexico, placed an unreasonable and undue burden on interstate commerce and 
subjected Internet users to inconsistent state regulations. Johnson, 4 F. Supp. 2d at 
1033-34. Hansen also said that the statute's defenses-use of mandatory age or credit 
card notification software-were cost prohibitive to Internet context providers. I d. 
129 ACLU v. Miller, 977 F. Supp. 1228 (N.D. Ga. 997). Zell Miller is governor of the 
state of Georgia. 
130Miller, 977F. Supp. at 1228, GA. CODE ANN.§ 16-9-93.1 (1996). The statute made it 
unlawful for an entity to knowingly transmit data through the Internet or other 
computer transmission facilities if such data "uses any individual name, trade name, 
registered trademark, logo, legal or official seal, or copyrighted symbol to falsely 
identify the person, organization or representive transmitting such data" or to state or 
imply that the entity has permission to use such symbol, etc., when the entity has not 
obtained such permission. GA. CODE ANN.§ 16-9-93.1(a). 
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make innocent people think they were in violation, and allow the state to 
selectively prosecute who it wanted.131 Shoob said he expressed concern that 
the law would chill legal speech.132 The Georgia statute made it criminal for 
"any person to knowingly transmit any data by a computer network" for 
purposes such as "exchanging data with an electronic information storage bank 
or point of access to electronic information" if those people "use" a name to 
falsely identify themselves, or if they use a trade name or logo in their 
identification that would falsely imply they had permission for its use.133 
By attacking the sometimes deceptive domain names and e-mail addresses 
of Internet users, Georgia lawmakers might have eliminated possibilities for 
confusion over location, and helped to prevent Internet fraud or 
misrepresentation. The state contended that the law aimed to prevent fraud 
which it claimed as the local interest it was aiding with the legislation in 
question.134 However, as Judge Shoob alluded to in his opinion, the law had 
an extraterritorial effect that burdened interstate commerce and outweighed 
the benefit it gave to the state of Georgia.135 Specifically, it restricted Internet 
content providers' use of World Wide Web "links" to lead or connect a viewer 
from their Web site to another site run by a person in Georgia or somewhere 
else.136 The law's authors, like in Pataki, could not partition its effect to 
intrastate communication because of the vaguity of the domain names or 
addresses they were limiting, causing a chill in Internet communication. 
A fair reading of the clause, as written, is that it prohibits the current 
use of web page links. The linking function requires publishers of web 
pages to include symbols designating other web pages which may be 
of interest to a user. This means that an entity or person's seal may 
appear on hundreds or thousands of other web pages, just for the 
purpose of enabling the linking system.137 
Shoob amplified the burden on interstate commerce when he discovered a 
variety of less restrictive Georgia statutes already in place to address fraud and 
misrepresentation, such as statutes criminalizing computer theft by deception, 
unauthorized and deceitful use of name or seal of another and unfair and 
131Jd. at 1232-34. 
132Jd. at 1234. 
133GA. CODE ANN.§ 16-9-93.1 (1996). 
134Miller, 977 F. Supp. at 1232. 
135See Pike, 397 U.S. at 137. 
136Miller, 977 F. Supp. at 1233, n.S. 
137Jd. "The appearance of the seal, although completely innocuous, would definitely 
'imply' to many users that permission for use had been obtained. Defendants have 
articulated no compelling state interest that would be furthered by restricting the linking 
function in this way." Id. 
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deceptive consumer trade practices.138 Unlike Judge Preska, Judge Shoob did 
not limit Internet regulations to the federal sector.139 
E. People v. Lipsitz: Limitations to Commerce Clause Application? 
Despite the Pataki disavowance of all state regulation of Internet content, a 
New York state court decision soon after Pataki contends some state Internet 
regulation passes constitutional muster.140 State consumer fraud statutes that 
merely "tangentially" imply a burden to interstate commerce should stand in 
the face of the Internet's geographically vague nature, said the court in People 
v. Lipsitz, a case decided three days after Pataki.l41 The decision initially might 
beg distinction because it deals with an existing state law being applied to a 
new medium, rather than testing a law targeted directly at a particular 
medium.l42 The extent of the impact potentially caused by the Lipsitz case is 
discussed below. 
The defendant, Kevin Jay Lipsitz, was restrained from fraudulent activities 
he committed in association with his business of soliciting magazine 
subscriptions through bulk e-mail messages.143 Defendant, among other 
activities, used false e-mail addresses and false testimonials from fictitious 
members of listservs and newsgroups to attract sales from other members of 
those groups.144 After the interested parties sent their money to the defendant's 
service, they either received no magazines or a few sporadic issues.145 
Determining that all of the defendant's activities occurred in New York, the 
state attorney general charged the defendant with violations of state consumer 
fraud laws.146 
Unlike the laws implicated in Pataki and Miller, the consumer fraud statute 
in question in Lipsitz specifically targets only residents of the state of New 
York.l47 Consumer fraud laws affect people outside the state's boundaries on 
purpose but, the prosecution contended, only to include outsiders' fraud 
claims against a state resident,l48 Judge Diane A. Lebedeff in the Lipsitz case 
138Jd. at 1234. 
139Jd. 
140Lipsitz, 663 N.Y.S.2d at 468. 
141Jd. at 468,475. 
142Jd. at 471. See also N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW§§ 349, 350 (McKinney 1984). 
143Lipsitz, 663 N.Y.S.2d at 470. 
144Jd. at 470,471. 
145Jd. at 470. 
146Jd. at 474. 
147N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAw§§ 349,350 (McKinney 1984). 
148Lipsitz, 663 N.Y.S.2d at 473. 
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termed the connection with interstate commerce "tangential."149 However, 
according to Judge Lebedeff, even if the law were more general, neither the 
Commerce Clause nor the Internet's complicated geographic problems would 
prevent the law's applicability at least in this particular situation.ISO 
[F]or Internet consumer fraud claims, the Internet medium is 
essentially irrelevant, for the focus is primarily upon the location of the 
messenger and whether the messenger delivered what was purchased. 
In some cases, it might be necessary to analyze the location of certain other 
business operations, such as the site used or the place orders were received. 
Such refinements are unnecessary here for the entire enterprise was 
firmly based in New York State (emphasis added).151 
Concepts that might have invalidated state laws that have interstate effects 
should not stop New York's attorney general from enforcing a state law against 
a local seller who happened to sell his products on the internet.l52 
There is no compelling reason to find that local legal officials must take 
a "hands off" approach just because a crook or a con artist is 
technologically sophisticated enough to sell on the Internet. Invocation 
of 'the Internet' is not the equivalent to a cry of 'sanctuary' upon a 
criminal's entry into a medieval church.153 
Interestingly, the defendant in Lipsitz did not raise a Commerce Clause 
argument. The judge raised it.l54 Perhaps because of that, readers have little on 
which to consider an argument that the burden on interstate commerce exceeds 
the benefits of the statute. Nor do we have knowledge of whether, as evidenced 
by the out-of-state complaints, Lipsitz subjected himself to inconsistent laws 
because of the access any Internet user could have to the messages he left in 
cyberspace, and because he targeted the world-wide Internet audience .ISS An 
equally looming question is whether the sale occurred completely in 
cyberspace, or after an initial inquiry, the transaction happened in real space 
through a more locationally sound "snail-mail" system.J56 Answers to such 
questions could determine whether the locational vagueness of the Internet 
149Jd. at 475. 
I50Jd. In fact, Judge Lebedeff directly distinguishes the situation from the situation 
described in Pataki. 
151Jd. at 474. 
152Jd. at 475. 
I53Upsitz, 663 N.Y.S.2d at 475. 
l54Jd. at 474. 
I55See supra note 10 and accompanying text. 
156"Snail mail" is the common Internet term for the postal system. Regarding activity 
completely in cyberspace, see supra note 81. 
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would strengthen or weaken a Commerce Clause argument against the New 
York statute,l57 
In addition, despite Judge Lebedeff's insistence that the law was of a local 
concern and "touch[es] upon no known federal policy which requires 
uniformity," the opinion cites the law's similarity to laws in other states and 
states the sections are based on section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission 
Act,l58 With such evidence, instead of distinguishing the Lipsitz situation from 
Pataki, Judge Lebedeff's opinion actually implies that any state law regulating 
Internet content must have its basis in federal, uniform law, in line with what 
Judge Preska in Pataki recommends.159 
Lipsitz is perhaps the most recent argument for some type of state internet 
content regulation. Other recent arguments in favor of state regulation have 
surfaced on two fronts: the state's right under its police power and the federal 
government's lack of right under any affirmative Commerce Clause power.160 
As before mentioned, much of the states' content regulation centers on a 
child's access to pornographic material on the Internet. Historically, the power 
to "control the conduct of children" lies within a state's police power, much like 
its rights to deny minors the right to marry or to vote,l61 Specifically, sexual 
morality falls within state concerns.162 Congress, on the other hand, has no 
substantive power over sexual morality, nor does it have a general police 
power.l63 
Instead, Congress must find its regulation power in the Commerce Clause. 
As demonstrated in the 1995 case, United States v. Lopez, the federal 
government's commerce power has limits.l64 The Court in Lopez struck down 
a federal statute that outlawed knowing possession of firearms in an area the 
violator knows or has reason to know is a school zone.l65 "If under Lopez 
Congress lacks power under the Commerce Clause to protect children from the 
very serious problem of violence associated with guns in school1:l, it is hard to 
see why its interest in shielding them from private online speech should be con-
157See supra notes 83-101 and accompanying text. 
15BLipsitz, 663 N.Y.S.2d at 475, 15 U.S. C. A.§ 45 (West 1994). 
159 Pataki, 969 F. Supp. 160, 182 (1997). 
160 Amicus Curie Brief of Apollomedia Corp. and Bay Area Lawyers for Individual 
Freedom in Support of Affirmance, Reno v. ACLU, 117 S. Ct. 2329 (1997) (No. 1997 WL 
74391) [hereinafter Apollomedia]. 
161Apollomedia, 1997 WL 74391 at *10 (citing Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 
638-639 (1968)). 
162Jd. at *6 (citing Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 502 (1957)). 
163Jd. 
164514 u.s. 549 (1995). 
165Jd. 
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sidered 'compelling'."166 Such an argument does not account for states' recent 
problems with violating the federal government's dormant Commerce Clause 
arena, nor addresses any potential conflict with the Internet's geographical 
ignorance. 
Of course, commentators Glenn Harlan Reynolds and Gregory A. Ichel 
suggest the federal government can always, in its authority, authorize a 
Commerce Clause violation to allow the states to regulate the internet,l67 
Recent events, however, show that rationale does not appear to be in the federal 
government's interest,168 as Congress and the Clinton administration attempt 
to regulate the Internet from a national perspective. 
V. FEDERAL REGULATION: ZONING WITHOUT ZONES 
Congress has already tried and failed once to regulate content on the 
Internet, with 1996's CDA,l69 Nonetheless, several commentators,170 including 
two Supreme Court justices,171 see in the failed act's intent an indirect way to 
harness the Internet's content: to zone it. 
The first attempt to zone the Internet would likely affect pornographic 
material.172 Zoning by content must pass the muster of particular rules set 
down by the Court. Internet sites' lack of fixed location, at first glance, makes 
l66Apollomedia, 1997 WL 74391 at *7. 
167Reynolds, supra note 81, at 542 n.20. See also Gregory lchel, Internet Sounds Death 
Knell For Use Taxes: States Continue to Scream over Lost Revenues, 27 SETON HALL L. REv. 
643,656 (1997). 
l68See infra notes 223-30 and accompanying text. 
16947 U.S.C.A. § 223(a)-(h) (West 1994 and Supp.1997). That's not to say Congress has 
stopped trying to regulate Internet content. S.R. 1482 seeks to prohibit commercial 
operators from distributing materials harmful to minors. S.R. 1482, 105th Cong. (1998). 
<ftp:/ /ftp.loc.gov /pub/thomas/ c105/s1482.is.txt.> (visited Sept. 9, 1998) The bill, 
dubbed "CDA II," is a step back for legislators. The original CDA outlawed both 
commercial and non-commercial distribution of the rna terials. See Senate Measures Would 
Limit Minors' Access to 'Cyberporn' (posted March 14, 1998) (visited Sept. 9, 1998) 
<http:/ /cnn.com/allpolitics/1998/03/18/cg/ internet.html>. See also note 224 and 
accompanying text. 
170Lawrence Lessig, who was recently asked to help the government in the recent 
Microsoft antitrust litigation, is perhaps the most prominent. See, e.g., The Constitution 
of Code: Limitations on Choice-Based Critiques of Cyberspace Regulation, 5 COMM. LAw. 
CONSPECTUS 181, 185 (1997). 
l7lReno, 117 U.S. at 2351 (O'Connor, J., Rehnquist, J., concurring). 
172Indeed, the Philadelphia group that formed the CDA only wanted to target 
pornography. See Rebecca Dessoffy, Salvaging the Communications Decency Act in the 
Wake of ACLU v. Reno and Shea v. Reno, 45 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 271 (1997) (citingACLU, 929 
F. Supp. at 879). 
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application of those rules difficult.173 However, other facets of the medium, 
such as the small burden to access it, could justify location restrictions)74 
A. ACLU v. Reno: Justice O'Connor's Prognosis for the CD A's "Zoning" Motive 
On its face, the CDA prohibited Internet users from communicating in 
certain ways with minors.175 Specifically, users could not knowingly transmit 
"obscene or indecent communications by means of telecommunications 
device" to persons aged eighteen and under, nor use an "interactive computer 
service" to transmit "patently offensive communications" to minors.176 
According to the Court, the Act did not adequately define the content it 
prohibited.l77 Although the Act did offer several defenses for users to avoid 
sanctions,178 the Court struck down the act because its "overbreadth and 
vagueness" restricted adult users' access to several forms of First Amendment 
protected speech, and because the government had less restrictive options that 
could foster the act's purpose.179 The Court's majority did leave open the 
possibility for future Internet regulatory legislation)BO 
However, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, in her concurring opinion,l81 
pointed out that while some of the provisions indeed restricted adults, none of 
the CD A's contested portions purported to keep indecent or patently offensive 
material on the Internet away from them)B2 "Thus," she said, "the undeniable 
purpose of the CD A is to segregate indecent rna terial on the Internet into certain 
areas that minors cannot access," or zoning)B3 
Creation of "adult zones" on the Internet is perfectly valid and fits with Court 
precedent, O'Connor said)84 In addition, according to O'Connor, the Internet 
as a medium is almost as conducive to zoning as the physical world,l85 as 
evidenced by the identity screens many Web sites construct as an entrance gate. 
173See infra notes 216-19 and accompanying text. 
174See infra notes 220-22 and accompanying text. 
175Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2338. 
17647 U.S.C.A. § 223(a),(d) (West 1994, Supp. 1997). 
l77Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2344. 
178See 47 U.S.C.A. § 223(e)(5). 
179 Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2344-46, 2348. 
l80Jd. at 2339, n.30. See also It's Back to the Drawing Board After High Court Ruling in 
RENO, 14-3 COMPUTER L. STRATEGIST 3, 4 (1997). 
181Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2351. 
182Jd. at 2352. 
183Jd. 
184Jd. at 2351. 
185 Id. at 2353. O'Connor called cyberspace "malleable," making it "more amenable to 
zoning laws." Id. 
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Commentators agree: "If zoning is a perfectly permissible activity in real space, 
what possible argument would there be that this zoning is impermissible in 
cyberspace ?"186 
There are a few arguments. To pass constitutional muster, no zoning law may 
"unduly" restrict adult access to material or restrict minors from any material 
which they have a First Amendment right to access.187 Several provisions of 
the CDA failed the test's first part when compared to certain possible Internet 
situations, according to O'Connor. She recommended invalidating those 
sections only.188 For example, the rights of two adults, who should be able to 
communicate offensive material to each other, are infringed when in an Internet 
unit such as IRC, an unknown party entered and the adults could not determine 
the party's age.189 
The aforementioned factual hypothesis demonstrates a more general 
problem that O'Connor said she feared: that a zoning law constructed to mirror 
the physical world's zoning laws might not zone out minors, presumably 
because of the locational and identificational vaguities associated with the 
Internet medium)90 The zoning law theory is further weakened, O'Connor 
said, becau$e it must rely on technological advance for its backbone.191 As of 
yet, the "gateway technology" O'Connor sees as necessary to Internet zoning 
regulation is not prevalent.192 Site-based software that requires users to enter 
information about themselves, and self-screening software are both available 
to some extent, however.l93 But without "ubiquitous" gateway technology -
since the Internet presumably cannot be broken down into physical areas- the 
Internet remains "unzoned-and unzoneable."194 
B. The First Amendment's Time, Place, Manner Analysis Applied to Internet 
Technology 
The Court has initially reviewed most zoning statutes that regulate 
speech-especially those that appear to restrict pornographic material-under 
186Lawrence Lessig, Reading the Constitution in Cyberspace, 45 EMORY L.J. 869, 894 
(1997). 
l87Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2352. 
lBBJd. at 2355. 
l89Jd. 
l90Jd. at 2353. "[Before today][t]he Court did not question-and therefore necessarily 
assumed-that an adult zone, once created, would succeed in preserving adults' access 
while denying minors' access to the regulated speech. Before today, there was no reason 
to question this assumption ... " Id. 
l9lfd. at 2354. 
l92Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2354. 
l93Jd. See also <http://www.cyberpatrol.com>; <http://www.surfwatch.com>. 
l94Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2354. 
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a "time, place and manner" ("TPM") First Amendment analysis.l95 However, 
the majority in Reno cast aside suggestions to analyze the CDA as a time, place 
or manner regulation, deeming the Act a more invasive content-based 
"blanket"196 restriction instead: 
According to the government, the CDA is constitutional because it 
constitutes a sort of "cyberzoning" on the Internet. But the CDA 
applies broadly to the entire universe of cyberspace. And the purpose 
of the CDA is to protect children from the primary effects of "indecent" 
and "patently offensive" speech, rather than any "secondary" effect of 
such speech. Thus the CDA is a content-based blanket restriction on 
speech, and, as such, cannot be properly analyzed as a form of time, 
1 d 1 . W7 p ace an manner regu ahon. 
Content-based restrictions traditionally are deemed more of a burden on First 
Amendment rights and face a tougher "strict scrutiny" standard,l98 Were the 
Court to apply the typical TPM analysis to any Internet zoning-type regulation, 
such a statute would be hard-pressed to pass muster under the lesser standard. 
Courts will view regulations under TPM standards only if it deems the 
statutes or laws as content neutral and as concerned with the secondary effects 
of the regulated medium or place.199 Once classified as a TPM regulation, a law 
passes constitutional muster if it is "narrowly tailored to serve a substantial 
governmental interest" and if it leaves "ample alternative channels for 
communication of the restricted expression."200 
Statutes are content neutral if their proponents can justify them "without 
reference to the content of the regulated speech."201 For example, the District 
of Columbia park service refused to allow all-night protests in certain parts of 
a park.202 The park agents justified the prohibition because the law prohibited 
all-night camping in that area, regardless of its expressive qualities, and 
provided other ample areas where the offenders could camp.203 
In some cases, the Court has expanded the definition of content neutral even 
more. For example, the Court in a recent adult movie theater zoning case 
determined that a city ordinance was content neutral-even though it plainly 
l95See, e.g., Young v. American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50 (1976). 
196Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2342. 
197Jd. 
198Sable Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989). 
199U.S. Sound & Service, Inc. v. Township of Brick, 126 F.3d 555, 558 (3d Cir. 1997). 
200Jd. at 558. See also Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288 
(1984). 
201C[ark, 468 U.S. at 293. 
202Jd. at 292. 
203Jd. at 295. 
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treated adult theaters differently than other theaters-because its "predominate 
concerns" were secondary effects and not content.204 
The Court has compiled over the years a laundry list of effects deemed 
secondary. They include preventing crime, protecting the city's retail track, 
maintaining property values, and generally protecting and preserving 
neighborhoods and commerce districts.205 In a 1970's case, also involving adult 
theaters, the court upheld a zoning regulation that outlawed the theaters within 
1,000 feet of certain establishments,206 because the regulation was "unaffected 
by whatever social, political or philosophical message [the] film[s) may be 
intended to communicate .... What is at stake is nothing more than a limitation 
on the place where adult films may be exhibited."207 Though the ordinance 
forced viewers to travel to another part of town to see the films, such a 
restriction was incidental and minimal to expression.208 
At first glance, Internet zoning would seem to analogize well to the park 
example in Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence. Restricting adult 
material to a certain series of domain names "neither attempts to ban ... 
generally nor to ban it everywhere" on the Internet.209 The Internet has 
"established areas for" pornographic material "and forbids it elsewhere."210 
However, while federal legislators could theoretically zone the Internet in a 
number of ways, each way would potentially lack at least one characteristic of 
a TPM regulation. Although the CDA failed the content-neutral characteristic, 
recent technology offers more neutral avenues. 
One potential scheme of Internet legislation involves incorporating a 
"tagging"211 technology-called The Platform for Internet Content Selection 
("PICS")-into all Internet browser software. The legislation would require all 
Internet content providers either voluntarily to tag a "rating"212 to their site or 
to submit to a rating system. However, the legislation would allow search 
204Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc.,475 U.S.41,47 (1986). But see U.S. Sound & Service, 
126 F.3d. at 559. 
205 Id. at 48. 
206Young, 427 U.S. at 50. 
207fd. at 70, n.35. The situation would be quite different if the ordinance had the effect 
of suppressing, or greatly restricting, access to lawful speech. 
208fd. at 71. 
209Clark, 468 U.S. at 295. 
210[d. 
211See Jonathan Weber, A New Battle Over Keeping the Web Clean (posted Aug. 7, 1997) 
(visited Jan. 7, 1998) <http:/ /www.cnn.com/TECH/9708/07 /internet.decency.lat. 
index.html> (describing the probable PICS voluntary system approach). See also The 
!LPN Discusses PICS with Joseph Reagle of the W3 Consortium (posted Aug. 18, 1997) 
(visited Jan. 3, 1998)<http:/ /www.collegehill.com/ilp-news/reagle.html>. 
212See Weber, supra note 212. "The theory is that once PICS is in place throughout the 
Internet, a multiplicity of ratings systems would emerge .... Parents and others could 
easily choose .... [S]uch a tool will inevitably be used by public institutions and 
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engines to list any sites that had tags.213 The end result would be a system 
useable by parents to block certain content, recognizable by its tag, from view 
by their children.214 Because it in essence requires a tag on every Internet site, 
the regulation would have a neutral emphasis on content.215 
However, the regulation and any potential zoning legislation-would likely 
fail to address effects other than primary effects, since few if any effects of the 
Internet have been proven to exist that do not relate to its content. Unlike adult 
theaters and bookstores, which reside in the physical world, the content of 
Internet sites and the people that access it have not been linked to a depreciation 
of the value of neighboring sites or a decrease in sales of a nearby commercial 
site. The explanation for such a failure is obviously the theme of this Note: 
Internet sites and communication have no fixed physical situs, from which to 
determine their effect on other fixed sites. And users nor commentators do not 
know nor, because of the Internet's geographical ignorance, can they categorize 
all Internet sites in the various locations to track any secondary effects those 
sites might have on areas in the physical world. 
Legislators have several arguments as to secondary effects. For example, 
Congress could introduce legislation, under the guise of the Renton case,216 to 
add a distinctive domain name level to the addresses of Internets sites that 
purvey indecent material. The purpose would be to eliminate the negative 
commercial effect the more innocuously named sites might have on the 
legitimate commercial sites they are grouped together with when a user 
searches by topic on an Internet search engine.217 Congress might also consider 
similar legislation regarding unauthorized links in the same context.218 The 
lack of a location basis for Internet sites would complicate the process. 
At the same time, Internet sites' lack of geographical boundaries might prove 
a saving grace. Even if Congressional legislation restricting pornographic 
content were to falter under TPM analysis and face strict scrutiny, it might still 
pass muster. To survive strict scrutiny, a regulation must serve a compelling 
state interest "in a manner which imposes least possible burden on 
expression."219 The Court has strongly considered the protection of minors 
governments, if not here then abroad to restrict speech." Id. 
213Id. 
214Jd. 
215See U.S. Sound & Service, Inc., 126 F.3d. at 558. 
216Renton, 475 U.S. at 41. 
217See Shea, 930 F. Supp. at 930. Shea was upheld, without comment, by the U.S. 
Supreme Court the day after it announced the ACLU v. Reno decision. 
218See Washington Post v. TotalNews, No. 97Civ. 1190 (complaintfiled Feb. 20,1997, 
S.D.N.Y. 1997). See also Wendy R. Leibowitz, How Risky is Business on the Internet? 
Disputes Go Beyond the Choice of a Domain Name, NAT'L L.J., May 26, 1997, at Bl. 
219U.S. Sound & Service, Inc., 126 F.3d at 558. 
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from material deemed harmful to them as a compelling state interest.220 In 
addition, the types of burdens recommended to be imposed on users and 
content providers are negligible-no more than a few clicks of a keyboard 
"mouse" and a minute of typing.221 
C. Government's Hands-Off Approach 
Even presuming the federal government could constitutionally regulate the 
geographically vague Internet, as has been surmised in earlier sections of this 
Note, such presumption does not mean the government will do so. In fact, 
despite a flurry of possible legislation, President Clinton has announced that 
the government should and will take a hands-off approach to the Internet, 
leaving reforms to private industry.222 Industry monitoring of the Internet, 
while contingent upon antitrust obeyances, would push to the side problems 
caused by the Internet's ignorance of geography. 
Since the CDA's virtual demise, Congress and the President have both 
attempted more Internet regulations. Some members of Congress have 
proposed a sequel to the CDA, with more specifically defined violations and 
parameters.223 Others have attempted to tie federal discounts for Internet 
installation at public schools and libraries to use of content-blocking 
software.224 In December, the President signed into law The No Electronic Theft 
Act ("NET" act), which expands copyright infringement liability on the 
Internet.225 In addition, in July 1997, the Clinton administration announced its 
intent to continue to enforce laws to protects minors on-line, as part of its 
"Strategy for a Family Friendly Internet."226 
However, in 1997 the President led a charge to pass legislation outlawing 
state Internet taxes.227 Even more, President Clinton publicly announced, in 
220 Id. at 557. 
221Lawrence Lessig, Constitution and Code, 27 CUMB. L. REv. 1, 12 (1996-97). "This 
whole process took about a minute, and with this minute's investment, I was then armed 
with a code that would (I was promised) give me access to a wide range of web pages 
that similarly limit access .... " Id. 
222U.S. Releases Plan for Internet's Future (posted Jan. 30, 1998) (visited Jan. 30, 1998) 
<http:/ /www.cnn.com/TECH/9801/30/internet.html> [hereafter U.S. releases]. 
223 See New Internet Censorship Bill Ignores Landmark Supreme Court Ruling (posted date 
unknown) (visited Jan. 3, 1998) <http:/ /www.aclu.org/issues/cyber/updates/ 
nov1897.html>. 
224See S. 1619, 105th Cong. 
225See http:/ /www.aclu.org/issues/cyber/updates/ dec2497.html. 
226See A 'Family Friendly' Internet (posted date unknown) (visited Jan. 3, 1998) 
<http:/ /www.whitehouse.gov /WH/New /Ratings>. See also Gore Announces Steps 
Toward an Electronic Bill of Rights (posted July 31, 1998) (visited Sept. 9, 1998) 
<http:/ I cnn.com/ allpolitics/1998/07 /31 /internet. privacy I index.html>. 
227 See Cyberlex-Updated 8/97: Notable Legal Developments Reported in July 1997 Include 
the Following: (posted date unknown) (visited Jan. 3, 1998) 
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January 1998, a plan to "reduce the government's role as traffic cop for the 
Internet."228 The plan entails, among other initiatives, shifting many Net 
operating functions-especially the registering of domain names-to the 
private sector over a two-year period, and opening them to competition.229 
VI. SELF-REGULATION: A THIRD VIABLE OPTION? 
In several of his writings, commentator Lawrence Lessig predicts that to 
successfully regulate the Internet, the government will shift to a different 
regulatory technique: regulating indirectly.230 Perhaps the government 
already has. 
Over the past few years, it has appeared as if private Internet industry, free 
from the problems of legislators who must deal with the physical limitations 
of the law, has begun to zone and regulate itself and create its own 
geography.231 Many Internet sites that house risque content have built 
"computer graphical interfaces" or "cgi's" around their sites.232 Providers use 
cgi's so that users must, before entering, provide either a password obtained 
directly from the content provider or a password obtained from an 
independent organization that checks user information.233 An independent 
group of Internet industry leaders recently recommended a further "cyber-
<http:/ /www.cyberlaw.com/ cylx0707.html>. The 105th Congress has grappled with 
how long a moratorium on taxes to impose. See Vote Bodes Ill for Internet Tax Agreement 
(posted Aug. 3, 1998) (visited Sept. 9, 1998) 
<http:/ /cnn.com/ ALLPOLITICS/1998/08/03/ cg/internet.html>. Sales taxes on 
Internet purchases would not be affected, however, as long as they apply only to 
transactions within the same state. See Internet Firms Seek End to Taxes (posted Sept. 8, 
1998) (visited Sept. 8, 1998) <http:/ /www.cnn.com/ 
ALLPOLITICS/1998/09/08/internet.apl>. 
228See U.S. releases, supra, note 223. 
229 Id. Although access to the Internet and many operations are effectively controlled 
by private interests already, the government has maintained a management and 
bankrolling function in areas of cyberspace invisible to the average surfer of the World 
Wide Web. The Defense Department, for example, has financed the Internet Assigned 
Numbers Authority, which allocates blocks of numerical addresses used by Internet 
service providers and is run by an institute at the University of Southern California. 
That's one of the responsibilities the government wants to give up. Id. 
230Lessig, supra note 187, at 910. See also Weber, supra note 212. 
231 Lessig, supra note 187, at 888. "Quite without government mandate and indeed 
without anything like a centralized process of decision, cyberspace is already becoming 
something quite different. ... It is moving, that is, from a relatively unzoned place to a 
universe that is extraordinarily well-zoned." I d. 
232Jd. at 887. 
233Jd. 
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spacial" boundary: forcing all sites that contain indecent content to have the 
top domain designation "-.xxx."234 
In December 1997, the on-line industry agreed with federal police 
organizations to report instances of pornography, and adopted voluntary 
guidelines to help keep social security numbers and other sensitive personal 
information "out of publicly accessed databases,"235 in effect creating its own 
police force. Microsoft and Netscape, two of the biggest giants in Internet 
software, agreed to gradually include parental control software that recognizes 
"tagging" into all of their Web browser products.236 
However, the independence of the industry efforts is questionable. It is 
disputed as to whether content providers would have built cgi's without the 
threat of CDA penalties,237 and as to the influence the government might have 
over the industry's decisions.238 
VII. CONCLUSION 
It appears as if, by a legal process of elimination, self-regulation is the most 
attractive and immediate means to regulate the Internet. Internet sites' lack of 
a firm physical situs could cause any state regulation to balloon into an 
extraterritorial regulation.239 One result is predictable: chilled speech. Federal 
regulations, which still look promising in the form of zoning, face an uphill 
battle. Congressional legislators would have to prove the existence of 
secondary effects on the Internet, or face strict scrutiny, a battle they could 
win.240 
The intent of this Note is not to determine a solution for legislators 
attempting to regulate the Internet, because as of yet, the information is too 
sparse to formulate one. Instead, this Note attempts to flesh out the problems 
legislators on all levels have faced or will face when they attempt regulation. 
True self-regulation has its own problems. Working without precedent, 
without even a firm handle on what analogy to use for the Internet, 
self-regulators could face the task of creating and implementing an entirely 
234See http:/ /www.cyberlaw.com/cylx0997.html (listing notable Internet develop-
ments for September 1997). "The Generic Top-Level Domain Policy Oversight 
Committee, an influential body consisting of 150 technology companies from around 
the world, has proposed that the suffix .xxx be used in Internet addresses for 
adult-oriented Websites." Id. 
235See Weber, supra note 212. 
236See A 'Family Friendly' Internet, supra note 227. 
237 See Dessoffy, supra note 167. See also Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 827. 
238See Weber, supra note 212. See also Forum Aims for Self-Discipline.on Internet (posted 
Jan. 7, 1997) (visited Jan. 7, 1998) <http:/ /www.cnn.com/TECH/9801/07 I 
internet.law.ap/>. 
239See supra notes 101-03, 111-13, 127 and accompanying text. 
240See supra notes 217-19 and accompanying text. 
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new rule system. That is, if they decide to veer from the federal government's 
recommendations.241 
More immediately, the advent of PICS technology-the Internet industry's 
most controversial step toward regulation-might be a step backward.242 
Whereas the CDA regulated only pornographic sites and content, PICS "creates 
an infrastructure for regulating every conceivable form of contentand to an 
indefinite degree."243 
Self-regulators admit they face an uncertain path toward creating an 
efficient, yet law-abiding framework for the intemet.244 Unlike the other 
legislative levels, though, their problems are lessened by their lack of need to 
address the sometimes unknown destinations and origins of Internet 
information. 
CHRISTOPHER S.W. BLAKE 
241M.A. Stapleton, Self-Regulation Seen as Major Problem Facing Internet Users, CHI. 
DAILY L. BULL., Sept. 17, 1997, at 3 [hereinafter Self-Regulation]. 
242Joshua Micah Marshall, Were We Wrong about the CDA? (posted Nov. 17, 1997) 
(visited Jan. 3, 1998) <http: I I collegehill.com/ilp-news I marshall3.html>. 
243[d. 
244See Self Regulation, supra note 242. 
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